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Based on psychological studies which show that metaphors and other non-literal constructions 
are comprehended in the same amount of time as comparable literal constructions, some researchers 
have concluded that literal meaning is not computed during comprehension of non-literal constructions. 
In this paper, we suggest that the empirical evidence does not rule out the possibility that literal 
meaning is constructed. We present a computational model of comprehension of non-literal expressions 
which is consistent with the data, but in which literal meaning is computed. This model has been 
implemented as part of a unification-based natural language processing system, called LINK. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Many theories of the semantic interpretation of natural languages assert that semantic 
interpretations are compositionally constructed; that is, the interpretation of an utterance 
is a fairly straightforward combination of the interpretations of its constituents. Katz and 
Fodor (1963) define compositionality as follows: 
On the basis of his knowledge of the grammatical properties and the meanings of the 
morphemes of the language, the rules the speaker knows enable him to determine the 
meaning of a novel sentence in terms of the manner in which the parts of the sentence are 
composed to form the whole. (Katz and Fodor 1963; p. 175) 
Problematic for compositional theories are so-called “non-literal” constructions such 
as metaphors, metonymies, figures of speech, idioms, and indirect speech acts. They are 
problematic because there is no straightforward way to construct their intended interpre- 
tations from combining the meanings of the morphemes that they are composed of. For 
example, consider the metaphor “No man is an island.” Literally, the word “island” refers 
to a body of land surrounded by water, but this sentence has an intended meaning beyond 
the obvious statement of fact that male humans are not bodies of land surrounded by 
water. 
How, then, are metaphors and other non-literal constructions understood? A point of 
contention with regard to this question has been whether or not it is necessary to compute 
the literal meaning of a non-literal utterance en route to understanding its intended (non- 
literal) meaning. Many theories developed in both A1 and psychology have extended the 
standard compositional paradigm to account for comprehension of non-literal constructions 
by asserting that literal meaning is constructed by standard compositional means, and then 
literal meaning is transformed to intended meaning by a separate set of rules. However, a 
large body of research in psycholinguistics has revealed that, in an appropriate context, 
metaphors and other non-literal constructions are comprehended no slower than compa- 
rable literal constructions, and sometimes even faster. This evidence, along with other 
related studies, has led others to conclude that computation of literal meaning is not a 
necessary step in the understanding of metaphors. 
In this paper, we suggest that the existing psychological data does not provide the 
necessary evidence to determine whether or not literal meaning is computed during the 
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comprehension of metaphors and other non-literal expressions. Moreover, from a com- 
putational standpoint, there are reasons to prefer an approach in which literal meaning is 
always computed. We present such an approach, and show that this model of metaphor 
processing is also consistent with the existing psychological data. 
An important feature of our model which distinguishes it from standard extensions of 
the compositional paradigm is that the non-literal interpretation of a potentially non-literal 
expression is automatically computed from the expression’s literal meaning, regardless of 
the context in which it appears. We argue that the existing data cannot distinguish between 
this processing model and one in which literal meaning is not computed. 
Our approach to processing non-literal expressions has been implemented in a natural 
language processing (NLP) system called LINK. LINK is an integrated, unification-based 
system, in which syntactic, semantic, and domain knowledge are all implemented in 
unification constraint rules. In order to process non-literal constructions, we have added 
a set of mapping rules, which construct alternative (non-literal) interpretations from literal 
meanings constructed during parsing. Context then determines which of the possible 
interpretations of the expression is most appropriate. 
This paper is organized as follows: first, we present an argument for why, from a 
computational standpoint, there is a reason for computing the literal meaning of a metaphor 
and for the use of mapping rules. Next, we examine previous computational models which 
have proposed the use of mapping rules, and the psychological evidence which seems to 
refute these theories. Finally, we present our model, and show why it is consistent with 
the psychological data. 
2. THE NEED FOR MAPPING RULES 
Let us explore further why non-literal constructions are problematic for compositional 
theories of semantics. Consider the following metaphor: 
The stock market rose today. 
As we discussed above, essential to any compositional approach is the notion that the 
meaning of a sentence can be constructed from the meanings of its pieces (either lexical 
items or phrases). However, if we combine the literal meanings of “stock market” and 
“rose,” we obviously will not amve at the correct interpretation of this sentence. We 
could define one or both of these terms as ambiguous, with “literal” and “metaphoric” 
senses, but it is not clear that we can easily separate the meaning of the metaphor into 
components to be associated with individual lexical items, as the compositional approach 
requires. For example, “rose” could be defined ambiguously, as either refemng to an 
increase in altitude or an increase in a numeric indicator, but this does not capture the 
generalization that almost any word which refers to a change in altitude can be used in 
the same way. Consider the following examples: 
The stock market plummeted today. 
My fever has gone up. 
Computer science enrollments are leveling off. 
The 10% jump in property taxes this year was outrageous. 
If we defined “rose” as ambiguous, we would have to define every other word which 
referred to a change in altitude ambiguously, also. This is inconvenient at best, and 
implausible at worst. 
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The same problem arises with other types of non-literal constructions, such as meto- 
John loves to read Shakespeare. 
Obviously, this sentence means that John loves to read the works of Shakespeare, not 
the author himself. We could encode the word “Shakespeare” as ambiguous, but as with 
our metaphor example, this metonymy is quite productive; that is, many similar examples 
can be found which use different lexical items and syntactic constructions: 
nymies, in which an object is referred to by mention of a related object. For example: 
I am listening to Beethoven. 
This painting is a genuine Picasso. 
Millions of people watched CNN during the Gulf War. 
Once again, it seems that the compositional approach fails to capture the generality of 
this construction: if we simply define words like “Shakespeare” and “Beethoven” as having 
multiple meanings, we have to define similar multiple meanings for a very large number 
of other lexical items. 
Examples like these are not uncommon. We will not attempt to argue this point here, 
as many others have presented convincing arguments as to the prevalence of highly 
productive metaphors and other non-literal constructions (e.g., Lakoff and Johnson 1980; 
Langacker 1987). Given their prevalence, it is important that we properly account for 
them, with a mechanism which explains their productivity. 
How can we write appropriately general interpretation rules for metaphors, metony- 
mies, and so on? Since they are often syntactically and lexically flexible, it seems that the 
only way to do so is at the semantic level. Instances of a given metaphor or metonymy 
share commonalities in “literal” meaning (e.g., all lexical items that can be used in the 
“rose” metaphor normally refer to a change in altitude) and also in “intended” meaning 
(e.g., when used metaphorically, words like “rose” refer to a change in value of a numerical 
indicator). Thus, it seems natural to write an interpretation rule that transforms the literal 
meaning of a construction to an alternate non-literal one. 
We will refer to this kind of rule as a mapping rule. In the case of the “rose” metaphor, 
the mapping is from a change in altitude to a change in value of a numerical indicator. The 
direction of the change in value is “the same” as the direction of the change in altitude: 
‘that is, increase in altitude means increase in the numerical indicator. In the case of our 
metonymy example, the mapping is from the producer of an item (Shakespeare; Beethoven, 
CNN) to the product (literature, music, news coverage). 
How can mapping rules be used in semantic interpretation? Comprehension of a non- 
literal construction using a mapping rule would involve constructing the literal interpre- 
tation of the construction, identifying the appropriate mapping rule, and applying the rule 
to the literal interpretation, thereby yielding the intended (non-literal) interpretation. 
In addition to capturing the productivity of non-literal constructions, mapping rules 
can also account for the ease with which people can understand many novel uses of a 
construction. This ease of comprehension is difficult to explain in the standard composi- 
tional paradigm. For example, a few years ago, before the current recession began, as 
economic growth slowed, economists started talking about a “soft landing” of the economy. 
This conveys a rather complex process of growth slowly decelerating until it levels off at 
around zero (little or no growth), without slipping into recession (negative growth). Despite 
the complexity of this metaphor, when the term was introduced into the American vocab- 
ulary, it seemed to require no explanation. A theory of metaphor comprehension based on 
lexical ambiguity cannot easily account for this, since “soft landing” previously had no 
metaphorical definition. 
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3. THE STANDARD PRAGMATIC MODEL 
Many previous comprehension theories of non-literal expressions have proposed the 
use of mapping rules (e.g., Searle 1978; Carbonell 1982; Induryka 1987). In fact, this 
approach has been called the Standard Pragmatic Model (Gemg 1989). Gemg outlined 
three general steps in the Standard Model: 
1. Consruct the literal meaning of the utterance. 
2. Identify a failed semantic or pragmatic constraint in the literal meaning. 
3.  Apply a mapping rule to transform the literal meaning to the intended meaning. 
Variants of this model have suggested more general reasoning or search techniques, 
rather than mapping rules, for constructing intended meaning once a failed constraint has 
been identified (e.g., Fass 1988; Ballim, Wilks, and Barnden 1991). 
The Standard Pragmatic model makes two predictions about processing. First, since 
steps 2 and 3 must be performed after completion of step 1, it predicts that comprehension 
of metaphors is slower than comprehension of comparable literal utterances. Second, since 
step 3 above is only executed if “normal” semantic and pragmatic processing fails to 
interpret an utterance, it predicts that the metaphorical interpretation of an utterance is 
not computed in a context in which the literal interpretation is acceptable. 
Numerous psychological studies contradict both of these predictions. In general, these 
studies have used two methodologies to examine how non-literal constructions are under- 
stood. One technique is to compare reading times for non-literal and comparable literal 
expressions. The comparison suggests what processes are present or absent in the com- 
prehension of non-literal expressions. A second technique is to look for evidence of the 
activation of literal and non-literal meanings of expressions in various contexts. This 
provides evidence for whether or not literal and non-literal meanings have been computed 
during comprehension. We will discuss both of these classes of results. 
3.  I .  Reading Times 
Many studies have shown that, in an appropriate context, metaphor comprehension 
is as fast as comprehension of comparable literal expressions. Ortony el al. (1978) reported 
two reaction time experiments designed to test how long it takes subjects to understand 
literal and metaphoric sentences in context. The method used was as follows: subjects 
read one or more sentences which set up a context, then read the target sentence, and 
then indicated as quickly as possible that they understood the target by pressing a key. In 
experiment 1 the context was either short or long. In the short context, subjects took 
longer to understand non-literal than literal targets, but in long contexts the reading times 
were not significantly different. In experiment 2, the targets were phrases that could have 
either a literal or idiomatic intepretation, depending on context. It was found that targets 
with an idiomatic interpretation took no longer to process than the literal interpretations 
of the same targets. 
Gibbs (1979) reported similar results for indirect requests. Subjects read stories, one 
line at a time, which ended in either an indirect request (e.g., “Must you open the 
window?”) or a direct request (e.g., “Please open the window”). In an appropriate context, 
the indirect requests took no longer to comprehend than the direct requests. 
Gildea and Glucksberg (1983) addressed the question of what constitutes an appropriate 
context for facilitation of metaphor processing. The authors proposed that any context 
which activates a property of the metaphor vehicle (the predicate in “All X are Y” 
sentences), and which is also informative about the topic of the metaphor (the subjects in 
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“All X are Y” sentences) will be sufficient to trigger immediate comprehension. That is, 
contexts which activate important properties of the metaphor ground (the concept under- 
lying the metaphor) facilitate immediate, automatic metaphor interpretation. 
The authors tested this proposal by examining the relative effectiveness of three kinds 
of priming contexts: activation of the figurative sense of the metaphor ground; activation 
of the literal sense of the metaphor ground; and activation of the general semantic field of 
the ground. All three types of contexts led to immediate and automatic metaphor compre- 
hension. The proof of immediate comprehension lies in the metaphor interference effect, 
as reported in Glucksberg et al. (1982) below. The results of these experiments showed 
that any context, literal or figurative, that activates the ground concept of a metaphor will 
facilitate metaphor comprehension equally well. 
Inhoff er al. (1984) conducted several experiments to discover more about how context 
affects the processing of both literal and non-literal sentences. The first two experiments 
addressed two issues: First, do metaphors really take longer to process given a short 
context, as found by Ortony er al., or was it simply that in Ortony’s experiment the short 
contexts turned out to be bad contexts? A related question is: how long do literal sentences 
take to process given a bad context in which to interpret them? Second, given longer 
contexts, are metaphors and literal sentences really processed in the same amount of time? 
In the first experiment, Ortony’s results were replicated. Short contexts increased 
metaphor processing times, but not literal processing times. In the second experiment, 
Ortony’s results were again replicated. Long contexts facilitated metaphor processing and 
literal processing equally. 
Inhoff reports a third experiment that addressed two further issues: First, will a short 
context (only one sentence) which is designed to activate the appropriate literal or figurative 
meaning of the target result in equal processing times for both metaphor and literal targets? 
Second, is there any support for the “process priming” hypothesis? This hypothesis asserts 
that if there is a separate “metaphor processing unit” that is activated during the processing 
of metaphors but not during literal language, then the processing of a figurative context 
should speed up the processing of a figurative target. The process priming hypothesis 
predicts that figurative primes will better facilitate target understanding than literal target 
understanding (because the “metaphor processing unit” has already been activated by 
processing the context); and conversely, literal primes will facilitate literal targets better 
than figurative targets. 
The results from experiment 3 were .as follows: first, there was no evidence the 
metaphoric targets took longer to process than literal targets, even though all contexts 
were short. That is, the quality of context is what counts, not its length; second, there 
was some support for the process priming hypothesis, because figurative contexts better 
facilitated figurative targets, and literal contexts better facilitated literal targets. However, 
these results only applied within each trial; there was no similar priming effect between 
trials; i-e., a metaphoric target in trial J did not prime a metaphoric contexdtarget in trial 
J + 1. The evidence for the process priming hypothesis is therefore inconclusive. 
More recent experiments have on the whole confirmed that many types of non-literal 
statements take no longer to process than literal statements. See Gerrig (1989) or Gibbs 
(1984) for a more extensive discussion of the evidence. 
3.2. Activation of Literal and Nan-literal Meanings 
Gibbs has also examined the question of whether or not literal meanings of indirect 
requests are activated during comprehension. In (Gibbs 1983), he found no evidence for 
activation of literal meaning if an indirect request was comprehended in an appropriate 
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context. Immediately after reading an indirect request such as “Can you pass the salt?” 
subjects were asked to make sentencehonsentence judgments on target sentences. When 
the target was a paraphrase of the literal meaning of the indirect request (e.g., a target 
about ability to pass the salt), there was no facilitation of this judgment task from the 
indirect request preceding it. However, in the reverse situation, facilitation did occur: 
subjects were faster at making sentencehonsentence judgments on paraphrases of the 
indirect request meaning if the request appeared in a context in which it was interpreted 
literally. Gibbs concluded from this assymmetry of priming that literal meaning of indirect 
requests was not computed, but that the non-literal meaning always was. 
Cacciari and Tabossi (1988) also found that, for some idioms, literal meaning is not 
activated after the final word of an idiomatic construction. Subjects listened to sentences 
which contained idioms, such as “After winning the match, the tennis player was in seventh 
heaven.” Immediately after hearing the final word of the idiomatic construction (in this 
case, “heaven”), subjects were given a visual word judgment task. Words which were 
semantically related to the idiomatic meaning were primed, but targets that were related 
to the literal meaning of the final word in the idiom were not. However, Cacciari and 
Tabossi found that this result depended on the familiarity of the idioms used. In a follow- 
up experiment, subjects were pretested to see if they could complete an idiom when shown 
the first few words in the idiom. Subjects who succeeded in this completion task were 
screened, and a similar priming experiment was conducted. This time, it was found that 
immediately after hearing the final word of an idiom, words related to the literal meaning 
of the final word were primed, but words related to the meaning of the idiom were not. 
After 300 msecs, targets related to the idiomatic meaning became primed also. 
Glucksberg et af. (1982) also addressed the question of when literal and non-literal 
meanings are computed, this time for metaphors. Subjects were asked to make judgments 
about the literal truth of sentences of the form “AlllSome X are Y.” Subjects took signif- 
icantly longer to judge the truth of sentences which had a reasonable metaphoric meaning 
than those which did not. That is, judgment about the literal truth of sentences such as 
“All men are wolves” was slower than for “All men are telephones.” Glucksberg et af. 
called this the metaphor inference effect. According to their analysis, the presence of the 
metaphor interfered with subjects’ ability to judge sentences literally false. Since the task 
only required subjects to make judgments based on literal meaning, the authors claimed 
that this interference was evidence that subjects computed the metaphoric meaning any- 
way. This suggests that metaphor comprehension is an automatic process, which contra- 
dicts the Standard Model. 
3 . 3 .  Interpreting the Psychological Data 
The evidence against the Standard Theory has led some to conclude that literal meaning 
is not computed during comprehension of non-literal constructions. Perhaps the strongest 
proponent of this view is Gibbs, who goes so far as to question the validity of the notion 
of literal meaning: 
Sentences do not have well-defined literal meanings, regardless of whether these are 
determined in light of a set of background assumptions. Moreover, the putative literal 
meanings of sentences do not contribute in systematic ways toward the understanding of 
speakers’ utterance meanings. These observations suggest that the distinctions between 
literal and metaphoric meanings . . . have little psychological validity. (Gibbs 1984; p. 275) 
The conclusion seems to be that, since the Standard Model makes incorrect predic- 
tions, all three main steps of the model are incorrect. However, it is not clear that this 
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conclusion necessarily follows from the data. Let us examine this question more closely. 
Summarizing the experiments discussed above, we must explain three findings: 
1. Reading times for non-literal constructions are no slower than reading times for literal 
constructions. 
2. Non-literal meanings appear to be computed even when expressions are intended to 
be taken literally. 
3 .  Literal meanings are not primed after comprehension of a sentence containing a non- 
literal construction. 
Do these three findings necessarily imply that literal meaning is not computed during 
comprehension? The first two findings are problematic for the Standard Model not because 
it states that literal meaning is computed first, but rather because of the failure-driven 
nature of non-literal processing. A non-literal interpretation is not constructed unless some 
difficulty is encountered in constructing a literal interpretation. Waiting for a semantic (or 
pragmatic) constraint violation before invoking a mapping rule results in the incorrect 
prediction of additional processing time for metaphors, as well as the incorrect prediction 
that non-literal meanings will not be computed during Comprehension of literal utterances. 
Thus, it seems to be step 2 of the Standard Pragmatic Model that results in the incorrect 
predictions. 
The third finding, that literal meanings are not primed after comprehension of a non- 
literal sentence, also does not imply that literal meanings are never constructed during 
comprehension. It is entirely possible that literal meanings have already been activated 
and then suppressed by the end of a sentence. We will have more to say about this in 
Sects. 5 and 6 .  
4. INTERPRETATION OF NON-LITERAL CONSTRUCTIONS IN LINK 
We now present our alternative theory of semantic interpretation, which is imple- 
mented in the LINK system. Though our model is similar to the Standard Pragmatic Model 
in that it utilizes mapping rules, it differs from the Standard Model in the way in which 
these rules are applied. 
In LINK, processing follows these general steps: 
1. Incrementally construct the (literal) interpretations of constituents in the utterance. 
2.  As interpretations are constructed, try to match them against mapping rules. If any 
rules match, also construct the result of the mapping (the non-literal interpretation) as 
an alternative interpretation of the constituent. 
3. Use contextual information to determine which of the candidate interpretations is (are) 
acceptable. 
This model is a refinement of Martin’s (1990) theory of metaphor processing.’ It differs 
from Martin’s approach in three ways: first, the construction of non-literal interpretations 
in LINK is an incremental process, which proceeds during the comprehension of a sen- 
tence. In Martin’s system, all metaphoric interpretations were constructed after completion 
of parsing. Second, mapping rules in LINK are used to process other non-literal construc- 
tions, such as metonymies and figures of speech. Martin’s rules were used primarily in 
metaphor comprehension. Finally, because the application of mapping rules is integrated 
‘In Martin’s theory, the initial representation constructed was called the “primal representation” of the 
utterance. We view this as equivalent to literal meaning, although it is not at all clear that Martin would agree. 
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FIGURE 1 .  DAG version of the S rule. 
with parsing, LINK’s mapping rules can contain a mixture of syntactic and semantic 
information. Martin’s rules operated strictly in the domain of semantics. The ability to 
include other kinds of information in LINK’s mapping rules is important in the processing 
of other types of non-literal constructions. 
Before we can explain the details of LINK’s mapping rules, we must give a general 
overview of LINK. 
4.1. LINK’s Unification Grammar 
All syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic knowledge is encoded in LINK in unification 
constraint rules. These rules are very similar in form to other unification grammars, such 
as PATR-I1 (Shieber 1986) or HPSG (Pollard and Sag 1987). Each constraint rule consists 
of a set of equations, each of which constrains the interpretation which the parser can 
build in some way, by limiting, for a class of nodes (i.e., any node with a particular label), 
the set of arcs that can lead from a node of that class, as well as the types of nodes that 
arcs can lead to. 
Here is a simplified example of a constraint rule: 
( d e f i n e - c l a s s  S 
(1) = NP <1> 
( 2 )  = VP <2> 
( h e a d )  = ( 2  head) <3 > 
(head  a g r )  = (1  head a g r )  <4> 
(head  subj) = (1  h e a d ) )  <5> 
Each equation in this rule specifies a property which says any node labeled S must 
have. A property consists of a path, or a sequence of arcs with the appropriate labels 
starting from the node in question; and a value, which is another node to be found at the 
end of the path. Equations specify the values of properties in one of two ways. They may 
specify the label of the node to be found at the end of the path, as in equations 1 and 2 
(i.e., the arc from an S node labeled 1 leads to a node labeled NP). We will call these 
labeling equations. Or, they may specify that two paths must lead to the identical node, 
as in Eqs. (3-5). Identity here is defined by the un$cation operation; i.e., if two paths 
must lead to the identical node, then the nodes at the end of the two paths must unify. 
Unification merges the properties of two nodes; thus, two paths can unify if their values 
have no properties which explicitly contradict each other. These equations will be called 
unifying equations. 
Constraint rules can be represented as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), whose nodes 
and links are labeled. The DAG form of the above rule is given in Fig. 1. The root node 
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of this DAG is labled S ,  because that is the class of constituent to which this rule applies. 
For each property specified in the rule, there is a corresponding path in the DAG leading 
from the root node to a node with the appropriate label (in the case of labeling equations), 
or there are two paths from the root node which lead to the same node (in the case of 
unifying equations). Thus, in Fig. 1, a node labeled N P  is found at the end of the arc 
labeled 1 coming from the S node. 
Functionally, the above rule encodes information about English sentences as follows. 
Equations (1) and (2) specify that a sentence is made up of two subconstituents: an NP 
and a VP. Ordering of these constituents is implicit in the numbering of the paths. Equation 
3 assigns the HEAD of the sentence to be the VP, by unifying the VP’s HEAD path with 
the HEAD path of the S. This will be discussed further shortly. Equation (4) specifies that 
the NP and the VP must agree in number and person. These syntactic properties are found 
under the AGR (agreement) feature of each constituent. Finally, Equation (5)  assigns the 
NP to be the subject of the sentence. 
The HEAD property referred to in Eqs. (3)-(5) is used to propagate information up 
and down the DAG. This is accomplished by unification of HEAD links, as in Eq. (3). 
Because of this equation, any information on the HEAD of the VP is accessible from the 
S node. Similar equations would unify the heads of other constituents, such as a verb (V) 
and a VP, or a particular lexical item and a V. 
Lexical items typically provide the values which are propagated by HEAD links. They 
are encoded in the same form as grammar rules. For example: 
( d e f  ine-class V 
(1) = e a t s  <6> 
(head  ag r  person)  = 3rd  <8> 
(head  a g r  number) = s i n g  <7> 
(head  r e p )  = EAT-FOOD <9> 
(head  s u b j  r e p )  = (head r e p  a c t o r )  <lo> 
(head  dobj r ep )  = (head r e p  o b j e c t ) )  <11> 
Typical values provided by lexical rules include syntactic feature information, such as 
the AGR feature; as well as semantic information, which causes a semantic interpretation 
of the sentence to be constructed as parsing proceeds. In this particular lexical entry, 
Equations (7)-(8) specify the word’s syntactic features, found under the AGR property. 
Equation (9) provides semantic information about the word, specifying that “eats” means 
EAT-FOOD. Equations (10) and (1 1) specify mappings from syntactic to semantic depen- 
dencies. Equation (10) states that whatever constituent fills the SUBJECT role will also 
be assigned as the ACTOR of the EAT-FOOD. Similarly, 11 specifies that the syntactic 
direct object (DOBJ) is assigned as the semantic OBJECT. 
Equations (10) and (11) are used in conjunction with the system’s domain knowledge, 
to impose restrictions on the semantic properties (i.e., the values of the REP path) of the 
subject and direct object of “eats” (i.e., the ACTOR and OBJECT of EAT-FOOD). Domain 
knowledge is also encoded in constraint rules. In this particular case, the relevant rule is 
the following: 
(de f ine -c l a s s  EAT-FOOD 
( a c t o r )  = HUMAN <12> 
( i n s t r u m e n t )  = UTENSIL) <14> 
( o b j e c t )  = FOOD <13> 
Because of the mapping provided by “eats” between its subject and the ACTOR of 
EAT-FOOD, the restriction that this constituent’s representation must be HUMAN is 
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propagated up to the NP which fills the SUBJ role specified by Eq. (5 ) .  Similarly, the 
FOOD restriction on the object of an EAT-FOOD would propagate to the NP assigned as 
the direct object (DOBJ) of “eats”, because of Eqs. (11) and (13). The direct object is 
supplied by the following constraint rule: 
( d e f i n e - c l a s s  VP 
(1) = v <15> 
( 2 )  = NP <16> 
( h e a d )  = (1 head)  <17> 
( h e a d  t r a n s )  = t r a n s i t i v e  t18> 
( h e a d  d o b j )  = ( 2  h e a d )  <19> 
Using these rules, LINK constructs a DAG as its interpretation of both the structure 
and the meaning of a sentence during processing. 
LINK is implemented in the style of a bottom-up chart parser.2 However, whereas 
links in a standard chart are labeled with a syntactic category, in LINK’s chart they are 
labeled with a DAG, representing all the syntactic and semantic features which have been 
assigned to each constituent. 
New links are added to LINK’s chart by applying unification rules such as the example 
rules above. Rules are indexed by subconstituents; i.e., by the values of paths which have 
numeric labels. Whenever a sequence of constituents in the chart is found which unifies 
with the corresponding sequence in a rule, that rule is applied. Unification guarantees that 
each constituent from the sentence has the syntactic and semantic features specified by 
the rule, or at least is compatible with those features. 
Because of the use of a chart, it is possible for alternate interpretations of a constituent 
to be considered simultaneously. This occurs whenever the chart contains two or more 
links whose subconstituents overlap. Selection of an interpretation is in effect performed 
when a complete parse can be found which uses one of the competing links. As we will 
see, the ability to entertain multiple interpretations of a constituent is important in the 
interpretation of non-literal constructions. 
4.2. LINK’s Mapping Rules: An Overview 
The definition of a mapping rule in LINK is shown below. A (labe1) is any syntactic 
or semantic category used in the grammar. A (var) (variable) by convention begins with a 
“?”, and the same set of variables appear in the left- and right-hand sides of a rule. 
(mapping-rule) :: = (spec) 3 (spec) 
(spec) :: = (label) (equation) . . . (equation) 
(equation) ::= (path) = (label) I (path) = (var) I 
(path) = ((var) (label)) I (path) = (path) 
Mapping rules are interpreted to mean the following: whenever the parser builds a 
node with the appropriate label, and that node explicitly satisfies all the constraints spec- 
ified in the left-hand-side constraint list, then an alternate interpretation can be built; 
namely, a node satisfying the description on the right-hand side. Variables indicate map- 
pings between the values of properties of the original node and properties of the alternate 
node. 
*See Winograd (1987) for a description of chart parsing. 
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To illustrate, let us consider three different examples of mapping rules. First, here is 
a mapping rule for the highly productive CHANGE-ALTITUDE is CHANGE-VALUE 
metaphor: 
CHANGE-ALTITUDE 3 CHANGE-VALUE: 
(change) = ?X (change) = ?X 
(object) = NUMBER 
The simplicity of this rule reflects the productivity of the metaphor. Rather than just 
providing an ambiguous definition for one word, such as “rose,” it automatically creates 
an alternate interpretation whenever the semantic content of any word (or group of words) 
is constructed that fits the LHS. Thus, sentences as different as “the temperature fell” and 
“The population of NYC is slowly creeping upward” are handled by the same rule. 
Additional semantic constraints in other rules would ensure selection of the appropriate 
interpretation, depending on the semantic category of the OBJECT. Thus “the plane is 
rising” would be interpreted literally, while “the temperature is rising” would be interpreted 
metaphorically. 
Mapping rules in LINK may be used to process other non-literal constructions, such 
as metonymies and figures of speech. Here is a rule for a common metonymy often used 
in conjunction with the CHANGE-ALTITUDE is CHANGE-VALUE metaphor: 
PHY S-OB J: 3 ?X 
(assoc-num) = (?X NUMBER) 
Many physical objects are used to refer to closely associated numbers, e.g., the stock 
market for the Dow Jones Industrial Average, or the thermostat for its temperature setting. 
This rule means that “stock market” can be interpreted as either the building or the DJIA. 
Finally, here is a rule for the idiom “to go through the roof,” meaning to go up rapidly: 
VP: j VP: 
(head rep) = PIERCE 
(head object rep) = ROOF 
(head obj word) = roof 
(head inf) = go 
(head rep) = CHANGE-ALTITUDE 
(head rep change) = + 
(head rep change rate) = FAST 
In this example, as with many idioms, none of the literal constructs of the LHS are 
relevant to the non-literal interpretation, so there is no need for variables. This rule also 
demonstrates that syntactic and lexical features of the construct may be used as easily as 
the semantic. Thus, the correct amount of flexibility is allowed for the idiom. In this case, 
ROOF must appear as the semantic object of the action PIERCE, thus restricting this 
interpretation to active constructions and disallowing examples such as “the roof was gone 
through by the stock market.” The rule also specifies that the lexical items “go” and “roof” 
must be used, disallowing examples such as “the stock market pierced the roof.” 
Now consider the following example: 
The stock market went through the roof. 
In parsing this sentence, LINK creates literal and non-literal interpretations (links on 
the chart) for both phrases (“the stock market” and “went through the roof”) before trying 
to combine them to form a complete sentence. The competing interpretations for each 
constituent coexist in the chart until one of them is used to build a complete parse of the 
sentence. In this case, given the semantic constraint that the stock market building is 
IMMOVABLE, and thus cannot be a (semantic) object of verbs requiring motion, then 
only the triply non-literal interpretation will unify to create a complete interpretation for 
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the sentence. If we make no such restriction, then three complete parses will be found, 
and the sentence is truly ambiguous. This example also demonstrates the flexibility of the 
first mapping rule, as alternate word definitions would need to be quite convoluted to 
arrive at the CHANGE-VALUE in this sentence. 
Mapping rules may also be used in LINK to process constructions not-usually thought 
of as non-literal. Some constructions, because of the productivity they demonstrate, re- 
quire a rule which operates on intermediate (i.e., “literal”) semantic interpretations. Con- 
sider the following examples: 
Mary gave John a lecture. 
John received a warm welcome from Mary. 
Mary got a big introduction from John before her talk. 
John gave Mary a ride to the airport. 
These are all examples of a common expression in English, in which the doing of some 
action to a recipient is expressed as “giving” the recipient that act. Just as with many 
other non-literal constructions, this expression is quite flexible, independent of syntactic 
construction and relatively independent of the particular lexical item. The mapping rule 
for this expression is the following: 
TRANSFER-CONTROL: .$ ?XI 
(object) = (?X ACTION) 
(recip) = ?Y 
(object) = ?Y 
Suppose TRANSPORT and SCOLD are defined semantically as ACTION’S, and we 
have the following definitions in our lexicon: 
(define-class N 
(1) = ride <20> 
(head type) = COMMON <21> 
(head rep) = TRANSPORT <22> 
(head rep instrument) = CAR) <23> 
(define-class N 
(1) = lecture 
(head type) = COMMON 
(head rep) = SCOLD) 
Here we can see the interaction of syntax and semantics. The constraint that the (head 
type) path must be COMMON means that these nouns require determiners in order to 
make NP’s, while the semantic structure of the underlying verbs as ACTION’S ensures 
that these nouns will trigger the mapping rule if ever found in a VP whose meaning is 
TRANSFER-CONTROL. Thus, “John gave Mary a ride” will produce exactly the same 
parse as “John transported Mary in a car,” and “Mary gave John a lecture” will result in 
the same semantic representation as “Mary scolded John.” 
4.3. LINK’S Mapping Rules: A Deeper Look 
Because of the other capabilities of LINK. the mapping rules have a slightly more 
complicated structure than shown in the overview above. There are two main points to 
consider. First, the DAG that triggers a mapping rule may have been built up from an 
arbitrarily long phrase, and thus have a very complicated structure involving many arcs. 
Since the entire range of such arcs cannot be predicted, no mapping rule can anticipate 
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all arcs that might be useful to keep (to map over to the right-hand side). Second, there 
are rules that add semantic informatioin to a DAG based on the label of its root node (such 
as the EAT-FOOD rule in Sect. 4.1). The information in these rules is very closely tied to 
the literal meaning of the word, and thus is unlikely to be useful when mapped over. 
To solve the first problem, the DAG that subsumed the LHS to trigger the mapping 
rule is unified with the result of the construction of the RHS. This unification is equivalent 
to having a default operation of keeping all the arcs of the original DAG when mapping 
occurs. This method may lead to problems, however, when the DAG contains arcs that 
have the same name as some that are created in the RHS of the mapping rule. Thus in the 
implementation of a mapping rule there is a set of arcs defined that are specifically removed 
from the DAG before unifying with the RHS. This set is called the THROW field. It is 
also useful for preventing certain classes of arc that the user knows may be present. 
To solve the second problem, the arcs that are generated by adding semantic infor- 
mation based on the semantic nature of a node in the DAG are tagged as “literal” when 
they are added to the DAG. These “literal” arcs are also removed along with all those of 
the THROW field that are present. Sometimes a mapping may be flexible enough to allow 
a literal arc to map across (e.g., the CHANGE arc of CHANGE-ALTITUDE is still 
relevant to the CHANGE-VALUE after mapping). Such arcs are listed in a set called the 
KEEP field. 
Thus a mapping rule is defined as in the previous section, but the THROW and KEEP 
fields are added to allow smooth integration with the rest of LINK, and to provide the 
user with another dimension of flexibility. Any mapping rule may be triggered at any point 
during the unification involved in creating a new link for the chart, whenever a node is 
created whose DAG satisfies the LHS of the rule. When this occurs, the LHS is matched 
to the DAG to bind the variables, then the “literal” arcs and those whose names appear 
in THROW are removed from (a copy of) the DAG. Next those arcs whose names appear 
in KEEP are added back to the DAG. The RHS is built, and unified with the modified 
version of the DAG. This new DAG is inserted into a duplicate of the link that was being 
created, at exactly the same location as the original DAG that triggered the mapping rule, 
and both links are inserted into the chart as alternate possibilities. 
To illustrate the point, consider the idiom “to go through the roof” defined in the 
previous section. None of the arcs of the matched DAG are useful, so KEEP would be 
empty, and THROW would include (head). This will eliminate all syntactic and semantic 
information from the DAG that triggered the rule. For the CHANGE-ALTITUDE to 
CHANGE-VALUE metaphor, most arcs will probably be useful, but KEEP will include 
the most vital ones: (change) and (direction). Other arcs that might occur are (speed) and 
(acceleration), but any such arc would automatically map over by default. 
5. LINK’S MODEL AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DATA 
Let us return now to the psychological findings on processing of non-literal construc- 
1. Reading times for non-literal constructions are no slower than reading times for literal 
2. Non-literal meanings appear to be computed even when expressions are intended to 
3.  Literal meanings are not primed after comprehension of a sentence containing a non- 
tions. Recall the three major results that we summarized earlier: 
constructions. 
be taken literally. 
literal construction. 
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Recall that these results contradict the Standard Pragmatic Model, which also uses 
mapping rules. However, our theory differs from the Standard Model in two important 
ways. First, in our theory the rules are applied automatically, regardless of whether or not 
semantic or pragmatic failures are encountered while constructing literal meaning. Second, 
in our theory a mapping rule is applied before the entire literal meaning has been processed. 
That is, the rule is applied whenever it matches the partial literal interpretation of the 
sentence built so far. The mapping rule then constructs an alternate (non-literal) interpre- 
tation of the input that has been processed. The result is that more than one possible 
interpretation of the utterance is constructed, even before the entire literal meaning of the 
input has been computed. Mapping rules never eliminate possible interpretations, they 
instead add other interpretations as alternatives. This differs from the Standard Model, in 
which literal meaning is transformed into (i.e., replaced by) a non-literal interpretation. 
Because of these differences, our model can also account for findings 1 and 2 above. 
First, literal and non-literal expressions will take the same amount of time to compute, 
because non-literal interpretations are always computed, even in contexts in which the 
literal meaning is the one which is intended. Second, the fact that non-literal interpretations 
are aufomafically constructed means that they will be constructed even in literal contexts. 
This accounts €or the findings of (Glucksberg et al. 1982) and (Gibbs 1983), in which 
evidence was found that non-literal interpretations were constructed in literal contexts. 
We still have to explain the third finding, namely that literal meaning is not primed 
after comprehension of a sentence containing a non-literal expression. This would seem 
to suggest that literal meaning has not been computed, which would contradict our theory. 
How can we account for this discrepancy? To answer this question, consider the situation 
in which an ambiguous word is encountered in an utterance. Swinney (1979) and Tanenhaus 
et al. (1979) have shown that all senses of an ambiguous word (even if it is syntactically 
ambiguous) are activated briefly (between 200 and 600 msecs), regardless of context, when 
the word is encountered, after which contextual information suppresses inappropriate 
senses. We envision that this same selection process is used in comprehension of non- 
literal interpretations. After a mapping rule has been applied, the situation is analogous to 
one in which all senses of an ambiguous word have been activated. As possible alternative 
interpretations are computed, contextual information constrains which interpretations are 
acceptable in that context. Thus, by the end of a sentence containing a nonlilteral expres- 
sion, it is quite likely that the literal sense of the expression has already been suppressed 
by contextual constraints, just as alternate meanings of an ambiguous word are suppressed 
by context. This suggests that Gibbs’s (1983) results indicating that literal meanings were 
not primed at the end of a sentence may have been due to the target appearing after 
suppression of the literal meaning had already taken place. 
This explanation does not yet account for the assymmetry of Gibbs’s results. Recall 
that Gibbs found that non-literal meanings were still primed at the end of a sentence which 
was interpreted literally. It is possible that the asymmetry of these results could be 
explained by frequency effects: if the indirect request sense of a construction occurs much 
more frequently than the literal sense, this might overpower the ability of context to 
suppress this meaning. 
Cacciari and Tabossi’s ( 1988) results also require further explanation. Recall that for 
familiar idioms, literal meaning of the final word was not activated, even immediately after 
hearing the final word. This suggests that if an idiom is familiar enough, subjects have 
already selected the idiomatic meaning as the preferred interpretation even before hearing 
the entire idiom. Thus, the idiom is triggered by a subset of the words in the idiom, rather 
than the entire construction. This is consistent with the general framework of our mapping 
rule theory. It simply suggests that, in cases where the non-literal construction is familiar 
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enough, the constraints of the appropriate mapping rule have been loosened so that it is 
triggered with incomplete information; i.e. , before the entire literal semantic content of 
the idiomatic expression has been constructed. If this is the case, a mapping from literal 
to non-literal meaning is still an essential part of the comprehension process, but only a 
portion of the literal meaning is used to trigger the mapping. Thus, we would predict that 
the literal meaning of earlier words in an idiom should be found to be activated if a similar 
priming experiment were performed with appropriate targets placed in the middle of the 
idiomatic expressions. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The psychological evidence that we have cited above clearly indicates that figurative 
meanings are processed as quickly as literal meanings, given an appropriate context. This 
evidence has shown the Standard Pragmatic Model to be an inadequate model of human 
processing of non-literal constructions. Since the Standard Pragmatic Model stipulates that 
the first step in understanding an utterance is to compute its literal meaning, and since the 
Standard Pragmatic Model’s failure to explain the psychological data is directly tied to 
this first step in understanding, the role of literal meaning in understanding has come into 
question. Many researchers, Gibbs among them, have claimed that the evidence shows 
that literal meaning need not be computed on the way to computing intended meaning. 
We have argued that the problem with the Standard Pragmatic Model lies not in the 
fact that it computes literal meaning, but in the process by which literal meaning is 
computed and used to compute figurative meaning. We have presented an alternative 
model of semantic interpretation which computes literal meaning even for non-literal 
constructions, but which is consistent with the existing psychological data. 
Although we feel that there are strong computational motivations for prefemng map- 
ping rules (see Sect. 2), it appears that the existing empirical evidence is not adequate to 
distinguish between Gibbs’s claim that literal meaning is not computed and our alternate 
model. The data are inadequate because, in general, they only tell us about processing at 
the sentence level, rather than the word or phrase level. The reading time comparisons 
which we have discussed have been done on entire sentences rather than on individual 
words or phrases, and priming experiments have tested facilitation only at the end of 
sentences. Thus, existing results say little about the process of comprehension of non- 
literal expressions at the word or phrase level. It is at this level that we could distinguish 
between the competing theories. 
What evidence would shed additional light on the matter? Recall that in our model, 
when a potentially non-literal expression is processed, the lexicon is accessed (to get the 
literal meaning of words/phrases), and then mapping rules are used to compute the non- 
literal interpretation of the utterance. Our model, then, predicts that the activation levels 
of literal and non-literal meaning should follow the pattern shown in Fig. 2. Upon encoun- 
tering a non-literal expression, the lexicon is accessed, resulting in the activation of the 
literal meaning at time tl.  A short time later at time t2, after application of the mapping 
rule is complete, the non-literal meaning is also activated. Finally, at time t3, context 
determines the appropriate meaning and suppresses the inappropriate one. These predic- 
tions are quite similar to the findings of Cacciari and Tabossi on the comprehension of 
unfamiliar idioms (see Sect. 3.2). On the other hand, Gibbs’s model would presumably 
predict that the literal sense of a non-literal expression should not be activated, even 
temporarily, in a non-literal context, since he asserts that literal meaning is not computed 
in these contexts. 
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Literal context 
- literal meaning 
nonliteral meaning I Activation Level 
11 t2 t3 
Nonliteral context ------- 
- literal meaning j /I\ - -  nonliteral meaning Activation Level 
11 t2 t3 
FIGURE 2. Predicted activations of literal and non-literal meanings over time in different 
contexts. 
The predictions of our model are analogous to the work of Swinney (1979) and Tanen- 
haus et ~ l .  (1979), as well as many other experiments on lexical disambiguation (see 
Sirnpson 1984 or Small et al. 1988 for a review of this research). Our theory predicts 
similar effects for non-literal constructions: regardless of whether a particular construction 
is meant literally or not, we would expect both interpretations to be active for a brief 
period. 
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